### SENATOR ZIEGLER KRITIK

#### Increased ‘high skilled’ immigration collapses wages

Huang 10 – PhD in economics @ KU (Serena, “THE IMPACT OF HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRATION ON WAGES OF U.S. NATIVES,” <http://www2.ku.edu/~econ/people/documents/JMP_HuangOt2010.pdf)//BB>

Despite the large amount of research on immigration, there is no consensus regarding its wage consequences. This study sheds new light on the effect of immigration in the United States by focusing on the high-skilled labor market, using a rich data set on scientists and engineers, exploiting cross-occupation variation in immigration, and incorporating a new instrumental variable. I find a negative and significant impact of immigrants on the wages of high-skilled native workers between 1993 and 2006. This analysis begins with the widely-accepted general equilibrium model and estimates the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives. Assuming a multi-level nested CES production function, empirical results fail to reject the null hypothesis that high-skilled immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within the same education-experience group. One would expect immigrants to lower wages of natives, given perfect substitution. The second method uses a reduced-form approach to gauge the effect of increased immigration on wages. Using a new instrument, the ratio of foreign- to U.S.-born bachelor’s degree holders, individual level regressions find a negative and significant effect of immigration on native wages. IV estimates indicate that a ten percent increase in employment due to an influx of high-skilled immigrants reduces wages of natives in the same occupation by 2.8 to 4.4 percent. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions that increased labor supply puts downward pressure on wages. Because there is some evidence of imperfect substitution between female immigrants and 28 natives, the effect of immigration may be less severe among women. Reduced-form estimates confirm this hypothesis and indicate increased immigration has larger negative wage effects on male native workers but does not reduce wages of female natives.

#### These immigrants will literally eat the money in the treasury as if they are baked goods, or fruits

C.B.O. ‘17

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE - S. 1615 - Dream Act of 2017 - As introduced in the Senate on July 20, 2017 - December 15, 2017 - #CutWithRJ- https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/costestimate/s1615.pdf

S. 1615 would allow certain noncitizens—namely, inadmissible or deportable aliens— who arrived in the United States before the age of 18 to receive lawful permanent resident (LPR) status under certain conditions. If they met further qualifications—related to education, employment, or uniformed service—the bill would permit them to remove the conditional basis of their LPR status, making them eligible to naturalize.

CBO estimates that S. 1615 would provide lawful immigration status and work authorization to around 2 million people who otherwise would be physically present in the United States but lacking such legal authority. The bill would affect direct spending by conferring eligibility for federal benefits—health insurance subsidies and benefits under Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), among others—provided that those applicants met the other eligibility requirements for those programs.

S. 1615 would also affect federal revenues: The increase in the number of workers with employment authorization would affect receipts of individual and corporate income taxes and payroll taxes. Newly authorized workers also would become eligible for some refundable tax credits (included in the spending total below).

CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimate that enacting S. 1615 would increase direct spending by $26.8 billion over the 2018-2027 period. Over that same period, CBO and JCT estimate that the bill would increase revenues, on net, by $0.9 billion—a decline in on-budget revenues of $4.3 billion and an increase in offbudget revenues of $5.3 billion.

In total, CBO and JCT estimate that changes in direct spending and revenues from enacting S. 1615 would increase budget deficits by $25.9 billion over the 2018-2027 period, boosting on-budget deficits by $30.6 billion and decreasing off-budget deficits by $4.7 billion over that period. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply because enacting the bill would affect direct spending and revenues.

CBO also estimates that providing higher education assistance for newly eligible people under S. 1615 would cost $1.0 billion over the 2018-2022 period; such spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.

CBO and JCT estimate that enacting S. 1615 would increase net direct spending by more than $2.5 billion and on-budget deficits by more than $5 billion in at least one of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028.

This bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). Some state and local colleges and universities may experience increased enrollment as a result of this bill, but any associated costs would not result from intergovernmental mandates.

ESTIMATED COST TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The estimated budgetary effects of S. 1615 are shown in Table 1. The costs of this legislation fall within budget functions 500 (education, training, employment, and social services), 550 (health), 570 (Medicare), 600 (income security), 650 (Social Security), and 750 (administration of justice).

#### In fact, the Chinese must be obliterated

Bey, 18 --- Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor (2/6/18, Matthew, “The Coming Tech War With China,” https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/coming-tech-war-china, accessed on 6/5/18, JMP)

The United States is already in the middle of its next great war — even if it's only just starting to realize it. In the latest National Security Strategy, the White House highlighted China's growing technological prowess as a threat to U.S. economic and military might. The Asian powerhouse has taken on a leading role in several critical emerging technologies. Five years ago, by contrast, it was widely perceived as an imitator in technology, not an innovator.

As hard as it may be for Washington to admit, China is catching up in the tech race. The question now is whether tech firms in the United States, a country that embraces private enterprise and a free economy, will be able to keep up with their Chinese counterparts' breakthroughs.

The Disruptive Power of Dual-Use Technology

Chinese President Xi Jinping has made developing his country's technological capabilities a key priority, not only to wean China from its dependence on foreign technology but also to turn it into a leader in innovation. And sure enough, China is gaining ground on its rivals in the tech realm. The country has chalked up an array of impressive achievements over the past few years, including its developments in hypersonic missiles, human gene editing trials and quantum satellites. Of the many emerging technologies China is helping to advance, though, artificial intelligence is perhaps the most significant — for Beijing as well as its adversaries.

Google CEO Sundar Pichai recently posited that the advent of AI was "more profound than ... (that of) electricity or fire." If he oversold the development, he did so only slightly. AI may well be the most important technological advancement of our lifetime. What makes it so critical is that, much like aerospace technology or the internet before it, AI will have applications in military as well as civilian life — and will likely revolutionize both.

In the civilian world alone, AI has practically unlimited uses. The technology already helps power smartphone applications such as visual and audio recognition software and digital personal assistants. As global data collection rates continue to grow exponentially, AI algorithms will inevitably have to take over processing and managing the glut of information. AI will also transform the medical industry, diagnosing and treating various illnesses — to say nothing of the other white-collar jobs the technology will eventually complement or supersede.

The military applications, meanwhile, will be no less impressive. In 2016 an algorithm running on a Raspberry Pi — a $35 computer that fits in the palm of your hand — beat a retired U.S. Air Force colonel every time in a series of simulated dogfights. The computer, moreover, showed no sign of fatigue over time, unlike its human competitor. As AI continues to evolve, it will doubtless work its way onto the battlefield, driving tanks, ships and perhaps even robotic soldiers. The technology's potential for rapid data processing and analysis could give troops on the front lines a more complete picture than ever before of their enemy's position and activities. AI will probably find more applications in asymmetric warfare, too. Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria have used drones to deliver explosives to their targets, while Houthi rebels in Yemen have deployed unmanned vessels to carry waterborne improvised explosive devices. For now, these vehicles are operated by remote control, but in time, they could give way to autonomous technology.

An Eye on AI

The possibilities of AI aren't lost on the Chinese president. In a feat of meticulous blocking, two influential books on the subject stood on the bookshelf behind Xi during his annual televised New Year's Eve address. Weeks earlier, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released a three-year development plan for AI, part of a larger initiative launched in July 2017 that includes specific goals for such technologies as artificial neural network processing chips, intelligent robots, automated vehicles, intelligent medical diagnosis, intelligent drones and machine translation. China's Ministry of Science and Technology announced in November 2017 that it had formed a sort of dream team made up of the biggest Chinese tech firms — Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent — to lead the country's AI development alongside voice recognition software developer iFlytek. Each of these companies is hard at work cultivating the learning algorithms and hardware, and gathering the data, necessary to build a wide range of functional AI platforms. Baidu, for instance, has started developing open-source programs, such as the autonomous driving platform Apollo, to collect as much data as possible.

Nor is the importance of AI lost on the U.S. Department of Defense. Like his predecessor, Ash Carter, Secretary of Defense James Mattis supports the Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), despite calls from Republican lawmakers to roll the project into the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DIUx, headquartered in Silicon Valley, aims to ensure that the military can quickly adapt and integrate innovations that come out of California's tech hub. To that end, it awarded tech firm C3 IoT a contract late last year to develop an AI platform for the Air Force to predict when aircraft and equipment need maintenance.

In the quest to hone its AI capabilities, the Defense Department hasn't lost sight of China's own progress with the technology. The country's sheer size sets it apart from other tech innovators such as South Korea or Japan; China could scale up its rapidly increasing tech abilities and use them against the United States in a way that not even Russia has managed. With that in mind, Mattis made China's rise in tech a centerpiece of his National Defense Strategy, highlighting the U.S. government's need to strengthen ties with emerging tech companies, including AI startups.

**[graph omitted]**

A Space Race for the 21st Century

Today's mad dash for AI isn't the first technology race the United States has run. During the Cold War, the country vied against the Soviet Union to develop a variety of aerospace, nuclear and computing innovations. Washington emerged victorious from that contest; though the Soviet Union focused its efforts almost exclusively on military applications, it lacked the research and development capacity of the United States. The size of its critical industries enabled the United States to outstrip the Soviet Union in military technology while still diverting some of its attention and resources to consumer products.

Like the Soviet Union, China is interested more in national security and defense than it is in the commercial sector. The difference lies in China's size and in its economy.

The country's immensity could make it a more even match for the United States in terms of developing and adopting emerging technologies. Given that the country's population exceeds 1.3 billion people — and that data privacy is a low priority for Beijing — China offers its AI companies a big leg-up over their U.S. competitors by giving them access to a huge pool of data. Furthermore, unlike the tightly controlled Soviet economy that hindered innovation, China's hybrid economy offers individuals and companies incentive to push the boundaries in tech development. The country's model of capitalism isn't one of control, though Western media often portray Chinese tech firms as dependent on Beijing to subsidize and direct their activities. Instead, the central government outlines areas in which it would like companies to operate and provides incentives to encourage competition. AI is one of those areas, and China's tech giants are eager to outpace one another in the field. Aware that it missed the boat with smartphone technology, Baidu, for instance, has set its sights on AI as its opportunity to get an advantage over Tencent, Alibaba and Huawei.

For now, China lags behind the United States in the tech race, especially in semiconductor development. As the gap between them narrows, however, the United States will be forced to respond. The challenge for Washington will be that, unlike earlier dual-use technologies, AI applications will immediately have profound implications for the consumer electronics market. And because the Chinese and U.S. economies are highly integrated with each other, China's achievements even in the commercial sector pose a serious threat to the United States. The question for the United States isn't so much whether China can surpass it in the race to harness emerging technologies; it's how close the Asian country will come to doing so. China is large enough that its tech sector could give Silicon Valley a run for its money in terms of market share if it even comes close to producing the same technologies. For that reason, many U.S. tech firms are trying to withhold some of their advancements from defense applications in hopes of maintaining a competitive edge in the commercial sphere.

Building a Strategy

Once upon a time the United States could rest easy in the knowledge that no other country could match its combination of physical size and technological ability. Now China can. As a result, the current U.S. administration is working to develop a more robust response to the United States' budding rival. The White House's investigations into China's intellectual property policies, calls for greater scrutiny of its foreign investment activities and even proposals to nationalize the fifth generation wireless protocol, or 5G, network are all initial attempts to counter the country's rise in technology. So far, though, these initiatives have only provoked backlash in the United States.

Forging a comprehensive strategy against China will become all the more important for Washington as time goes by. The dizzying pace and unpredictable trajectory of innovation compels tech companies to constantly broaden their horizons or else jeopardize their competitiveness. But as the same firms expand their services into more and more industries, they risk running afoul of U.S. antitrust laws. The more companies such as Google, Amazon and Apple Inc. grow, the bigger the targets on their backs become. Antitrust investigations and busts in the United States, in turn, could give Chinese companies a prime opportunity to catch up to their competition.

#### Extinction

Annan 14, Nancy Annan is a Researcher with the Conflict, Peace and Security Programme at the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research 1/28/14, ("Stability: International Journal of Security and Development," No Publication, <https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.da/>) KS

Post-colonial rule of West African countries has been fraught with several challenges. Elemental among them are the issues of bad governance and corruption. Following independence, several regimes across the sub-region have mismanaged state resources and weakened governance institutions which has resulted in economic stalemate, political apprehensions and breakdown of social peace and stability. Today, these twin factors constitute a major cause of violent conflicts and civil strife in West Africa. Several scholarly works on conflicts in the sub-region have identified bad governance and corruption as the underpinning factors fuelling and renewing violence in West Africa. Conflicts in Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and other West African countries notably hinge upon bad governance and corruption. For instance, in the Sierra Leonean war, it was identified that bad governance, corruption and poverty were the root causes of the conflict (Fithen 1999). Additionally, research conducted in Liberia by Patrick Vinck, Phuong Pham and Tino Kreutzer in 2011 indicated that majority of the population (64 per cent) identified, among other factors, greed and corruption as the cause of the Liberian civil war (Vinck et al 2011).

Corruption in West Africa’s most populous nation, Nigeria, has been highlighted as one of the underlining factors in the Niger Delta conflict and the more recent, yet very pronounced, Boko Haram insurgency (Ejibunu 2007; Brock 2012). Ironically, the Niger Delta region though blessed with the largest oil resource in Nigeria is also the poorest region in the country. This is perhaps attributable to the high corruption at the national level which does not give opportunity for oil wealth to trickle down to the ordinary ‘Deltarians’ and the larger Nigerian population. In 2003 for example, the Nigerian Anti-Corruption Agency, the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) reportedly estimated that 70 per cent of the oil earnings, constituting over US$ 14 billion was stolen and wasted (Ejibunu 2007). Reportedly, the majority of the perpetrators of corruption in Nigeria include senators, ministers, commissioners and individuals with higher connections in the political playground (Ejibunu 2007).7 In affirming the linkage between corruption and violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Hassan Tai Ejibunu (2007) indicates that ‘seeing money coming from the Federal Government, on earnings on crude oil sales, with essentially none of it reaching the ordinary people, has created condition for insurrection’ (Ejibunu 2007).

Likewise, in a small country like Guinea-Bissau, bad governance and corruption are deeply entrenched in the social, political, judicial and economic system leading to bitter pent-up feelings among the local population which are sometimes expressed through violence (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). In their 2010 joint report on the ‘Root Causes of Conflict in Guinea-Bissau: The Voices of the People,’ Voz di Paz and Interpeace, international non-governmental and peace-building institutions, chronicled the voices of local citizens of Guinea-Bissau on issues of corruption and conflict.

#### The alternative is a refusal of systemic whiteness sustained through vampiric feeding of the politics of the anti-racist. Queering freedom is a process that ruptures the normative forms of understanding race and uses a psychoanalytic concept of morphological analysis to understand how whiteness affects the body and sexuality. Interrogating whiteness as pre-discursive opens up a nexus of analytics towards deconstructing race. A denaturalization of phallic signifiers exposes the fundamental lack suturing whiteness as the mauve foise qua rhizomatic governmentality of masculine power. This reverses the dialect of human/non human and instead reads whiteness as phallacized and thereby historicizes it. Reducing phallic encodings of body and race erodes the register of visibility through which Sinthomosexuality and unreason are synonymous with Bataille’s “eroticism of the hearts” – queer negativity and anti-futurism is the sacrificial logic of non-productive pleasure of the egoist lovers – it’s extra-political and transcends self-destructive economics------Failure opens the space for new performative potentials that unravel certainty and normativity. This opens a new participatory and process-based politics prior to and against representation. a new interpretative strategy of engaging the world from the position of abjection, negativity, and melancholy to collapse the demand for illumination, knowledge, and legibility------Only we have an explanation of the racialized images which instantiate the lack of darkness that can be sutured by desires for whiteness. Our material analysis of racial aggressivity produced by the white libido against the phobic-eliciting pathology controls the internal link to the will to mastery. analysis of and discourse on psychopathology and the deployment of these in both colonial oppression and anticolonial resistance; to the regulatory metaphysics that undergirds fetishization of vitality------neurotic, oscillation between the exposure and the replication of a regulatory maneuver What’s at stake is fugitive movement in and out of the frame, bar, or whatever externally imposed social logic—a movement of escape, the stealth of the stolen that can be said, since it inheres in every closed circle, to break every enclosure. This fugitive movement is stolen life------epistemological register of the modern subject who is in that he knows, regulates, but cannot be black------combatant in transcendental subjectivity’s perpetual civil war. To refuse the induction that Patterson desires is to enact or perform the recognition of the constitution of civil society as enmity, hostility, and civil butchery------a framework for failure—an embracement of negative emotions which is key to rejecting status quo oppression and creating revolutionary pedagogies------The 1ac’s cybernetic fantasy slides into the willed mastery of reality as scenario planning becomes an alibi for the most violent impulses of communicative capitalism and the university system – Institutional law detaches subjects from an ecological orientation to life and instead encodes them with the desire to merely survive within that institution – This strips away value to life and opens the door to capital exploitation------The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of a posthuman ethics of virtual ecology - This solves the aff—the alternative transforms digital subject formation to shared ecology and rejects individual notions of technological transcendence. The alt privileges perspectival and affective knowledge over the individualistic and feigned neutral posture of their scenario planning. Voting neg is a move towards an ethics that values the environment for itself and invests in alternative and indigenous knowledges – It hijacks institutional will to reduce subjects to bare survival, and turns that survival into a formational, transformative, and creative power with inherent value------Federal education policy is inherently intertwined with neoliberalism—reform efforts strip individual value, ensure co-option and pave the way for neoliberal domination—vote negative to opt out—only our strategy can dismantle the corporate takeover of education reform and ensure a truly ethical relationship to education

Winnubst’06. Shannon Winnubst, professor of Women’s and gender studies at Ohio State University, Queering Freedom, pg. 14-17 Introduction//KZaidi

So, is race biological or cultural? Or is it perhaps neither and both? As many have articulated quite clearly by now,21 race has no biological or physiological corollary or referent: nineteenth-century scientific racism should be long dead. But to argue that race is then ‘socially constructed,’ a rejoinder that dominates much contemporary work in this field, also seems to beg a number of questions, as scholars from a wide range of philosophical and ideological orientations have argued.22 (Not to mention the ways that this dichotomy between biology and social construction reinscribes the conceptual model at work in the sex/gender distinction.) To say that race is socially constructed is thus a shorthand that I find increasingly dangerous. It plays all too easily into conservative aims to flatten out the social field of power at work in racial distinctions, evacuating us all of agency or responsibility with the simple exclamation, “we are all socially constructed.” As I have seen too often in classrooms, it shuts down rather than opens up conversation: to say that race is socially constructed must heed Joan Scott’s warnings about the category of “experience” (1993) and be the beginning, rather than the conclusion, of a critical examination.

If we are to read race, and whiteness particularly, as both biological and cultural (and thus reducible to neither), the psychoanalytic concept of morphology opens ways to read the role of the body, as a nexus of cultural and biological signifiers, in the play of racial difference in racist symbolics. Irigaray understands morphology as the ways that concepts shape bodies and bodies shape concepts. Placing racial difference in this conceptual framework, I interrogate ‘whiteness’ as a historically emergent phenomenon in which the role of the body—and of embodiment more broadly—becomes a central site of power. Embodiment becomes this site of power not only as the surface on which the concepts of white supremacy are written, but also as a primary vehicle whose logic shapes those very concepts—and in this, whiteness functions as the phallus in the socio-psychic field.

When read as phallicized, the signifier ‘whiteness’ becomes both the structuring element and the effect of a set of cultural practices and discourses that historically confer disproportionate, and often abusive, power on some persons over and in excess of others. As the structuring element, ‘whiteness’ functions much as the phallus does in Lacan’s diagnosis: it is the dominant or ‘master’ signifier around which all other signifiers and practices are oriented—it shapes the ways they do and do not interact, the blind spots they do and do not perpetuate, the entities, acts, and desires they do and do not proclaim meaningful and thereby valuable.23 As an effect of these cultural practices and discourses, ‘whiteness’ is sedimented by repetition into a pattern that appears as solid, as ‘natural,’ posing as a prediscursive, ahistorical, ontological given.24 If we read this master signifier as a historically enacted set of power relations, we see what Frankenberg diagnoses: the characteristics which constitute this ‘whiteness’ are always in flux. Its borders “have proved malleable over time” (1997b, 633), granting it the power to regulate social fields of symbols (epistemology) and power (politics) while always remaining invisible. Employing the psychoanalytic category of morphology here, I discern the role of embodiment in what Richard Dyer calls the “semiotic flexibility” (1997, 21) of whiteness.

Two necessary conditions allow ‘whiteness’ to emerge as the dominant, phallic signifier and, in turn, allow the set of cultural practices and discourses which it engenders to dominate our socio-political field:

1) *‘*Whiteness’ naturalizes and universalizes its structural advantage through remaining unmarked and unnamed as a specific, historical set of cultural practices and discourses.

Following the pattern of privileged subject positions, whiteness poses as the universal and naturalized ‘order of things.’ In mutually grounding gestures, it renders itself both invisible and ubiquitous. These dynamics then sediment one another: the more transparent and invisible whiteness becomes, the more normalized and omnipresent it becomes, and so on. In this dual functioning of self-erasure and self-empowerment, whiteness relies on the continued veiling of its ongoing, historical shifting of categories, actions, inclusions, and exclusions that is necessary to keep its power intact. It must not surface as a historical set of signifiers. In this specific manner, I am suggesting that whiteness functions as the phallus functions in the Villa of Mysteries of Pompeii: only through remaining veiled can it control the signifying field as the master signifier. To historicize whiteness and mark it socially, therefore, is a critical tool in delimiting and localizing this alleged universal and totalizing grasp.25 To historicize whiteness is to unveil its functioning as the phallus and displace its power.

2) ‘Whiteness’ relies on a slippery play of embodiment/disembodiment that the dualism of biology/social construction perpetuates and the psychoanalytic category of morphology diagnoses.

Following Stuart Hall, I argue that whiteness operates as a structural set of cultural practices and discourses that historically confer disproportionate and often abusive power not only on specific persons, but on specific bodies—i.e., that this advantage is granted on the basis of bodily characteristics, DuBois’s haunting “hair, skin and bone” (Hall 1996b). Regardless of how much we hear from contemporary science (e.g., the much acclaimed Human Genome Project) about how race is not biologically grounded, U.S. culture will nonetheless continue to make racial distinctions—consciously, unconsciously, overtly, covertly, politically, personally, medically, and legally—on the basis of how bodies appear. The very appeal to biological science to ‘prove’ the falsity of race already places race in the domain of the body. The body—and particularly the body as surface appearance—simply will not go away in the carving up of racial distinctions and categories. It remains the intensely cathected site of and vehicle for the historically specific and changing discourse of race.

Reading whiteness as phallicized thereby affords many opportunities: we can unravel how whiteness functions as a historical set of cultural practices and discourses that poses as ahistorical and attempts to function structurally; we can read racial and sexual difference as cathected through the same nexus of signifiers in this phallicized symbolic, thereby grasping how power is negotiated differently for raced and sexed bodies, and the myriad combinations thereof; we can read racism as working through a binary logic that expresses itself as anti-black racism; and, as a primary location of these dynamics, we can begin to map the ways that the body, particularly “the body as seen” in the register of visibility, functions as the site through which a racist and sexist symbolic operates, thus ushering us into the thorny relations between the visible and language—or, in Lacanian terminology, between the imaginary and the symbolic.26

If ‘whiteness’ is the dominant, phallic signifier in the present discourses of race and if those discourses of race are centered on bodily distinctions, despite scientific and philosophical arguments exposing the lack of biological corollaries, then we need to interrogate the roles of embodiment and disembodiment in these discursive deployments of whiteness. How does whiteness’s deployment of cultural and discursive practices ensure a continued fascination with the body, while simultaneously marking out the space of ‘the disembodied’ or transcendent as the space of power? How does whiteness inhabit the body in such a way as to ensure that it transcends the body and becomes a ‘subject,’ while non-white bodies are fully reducible to the body and thus objects or abjected others?

The twin dynamics of universalism and disembodiment collude to pro- duce systems of power that allow ‘whiteness’ to emerge as the dominant, phallic signifier and, in turn, engender a specific set of cultural practices and discourses in the socio-political field. To frame these interlocking systems of domination as a system of “phallicized whiteness” is to argue that we can trace contemporary systems of domination, and their various interconnections, through these hallmarks of whiteness—namely, universalism and dis- embodiment. In the following six chapters, I trace how this system of phallicized whiteness expresses itself doubly: (1) in the identity categories of class and religion (chapters 1 and 6), race (chapter 2), sexual difference (chapter 3), sexuality (chapters 3 and 4), and nationality (chapter 5); and (2) in normative concepts of space (chapters 1–3) and temporality (chapters 4–6). My hope is that, through becoming more conscious of how domination writes itself on our bodies, we may better resist its seduction of freedom.

#### We must not cede the political to leftists

Beinart, 18 – is a contributing editor at The Atlantic and an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York (Peter, “It's Not Illegal Immigration That Worries Republicans Anymore,” 2-18-18, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/what-the-new-gop-crack-down-on-legal-immigration-reveals/553631/>) //kq

A few weeks ago, the contours of an immigration compromise looked clear: Republicans would let the “Dreamers” stay. Democrats would let Trump build his wall. Both sides would swallow something their bases found distasteful in order to get the thing their bases cared about most. Since then, Trump has blown up the deal. He announced on Wednesday that he would legalize the “Dreamers,” undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children, only if Democrats funded his wall and ended the visa lottery and “chain migration.” He would support a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants only if Congress brought the number of legal immigrants down. There’s an irony here, which was pointed out to me by CATO Institute immigration analyst David Bier. Until recently, Republican politicians drew a bright line between illegal immigration, which they claimed to hate, and legal immigration, which they claimed to love. Florida Senator Marco Rubio launched his presidential campaign at the Freedom Tower, Miami’s Ellis Island. Texas Senator Ted Cruz, who in 2013 proposed a five-fold increase in the number of H1B visas for highly skilled immigrants, declared in April 2015 that, “There is no stronger advocate for legal immigration in the U.S. Senate than I am.” Mitt Romney promised in 2007 that, “We’re going to end illegal immigration to protect legal immigration.” Trump has turned that distinction on its head. He’s willing to legalize the “Dreamers”—who came to the United States illegally—so long as the number of legal immigrants goes down. He has not only blurred the GOP’s long-held moral distinction between legal and illegal immigration. In some ways, he’s actually flipped it—taking a harder line on people who enter the U.S. with documentation than those who don’t. What explains this? Trump’s great hidden advantage during the 2016 Republican presidential primary was his lack of support from the GOP political and donor class. This allowed him to jettison positions—in support of free trade, in support of the Iraq War, in support of cutting Medicare and Social Security—that enjoyed support among Republican elites but little support among Republican voters. He did the same on immigration, where the “legal good, illegal bad” distinction turned out to be much more popular among the party’s leaders than among its grassroots. Cribbing from Ann Coulter’s book, Adios America, Trump replaced the legal-illegal distinction with one that turned out to have more resonance on the activist right: The distinction between white Christian immigrants and non-white, and non-Christian ones. The words “illegal immigration” do not appear in Trump’s presidential announcement speech. Instead, Trump focused on immigrants’ country of origin. “When Mexico sends its people,” he declared, “they’re not sending their best … They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists … It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably—probably—from the Middle East.” Trump, who often says bluntly what other Republicans say in code, probably realized that “illegal immigrant” was, for many voters, already a euphemism for Latino or Mexican-immigrants. In their book White Backlash, the political scientists Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal cite a poll showing that 61 percent of Americans believe that most Latino immigrants are undocumented even though only about a quarter are. “When Americans talk about undocumented immigrants, Latinos or immigrants in general,” they note, “the images in their heads are likely to be the same.” What really drove Republican opinion about immigration, Trump realized, was not primarily the fear that the United States was becoming a country of law-breakers. (Republicans, after all, were not outraged about the lack of prosecution of tax cheats.) It was the fear that the United States—which was becoming less white and had just elected a president of Kenyan descent—was becoming a third-world country. When the Public Religion Research Institute and Brookings Institution asked Americans in 2016 their views of immigration from different parts of the world, it found that Republicans were only three points more likely than Democrats to want to reduce immigration from “predominantly Christian countries” and only seven points more likely to want to reduce immigration from Europe. By contrast, they were 33 points more likely to support reducing immigration from Mexico and Central America and 41 points more likely to support reducing immigration from “predominantly Muslim countries.” What really drives Republican views about immigrants, in other words, is less their legal status than their nation of origin, their religion, and their race. Trump grasped that during the campaign, and in coalition with a bevy of current and former Southern Senators—Jeff Sessions, David Perdue and Tom Cotton—he has used it to turn the GOP into a party devoted to slashing legal immigration. On Thursday, when presented with a bill that traded the legalization of Dreamers for more border security but did not reduce legal immigration, only eight Republican Senators voted yes. However, 37 voted for a bill that legalized the “Dreamers,” added more border security, and substantially reduced legal immigration.